Abstract. This paper cryptanalyses the MOR cryptosystem [6] when the group GL(2, R) × θ Z Zn proposed in [7] is used. We show generic attacks on the system that work with every ring R. For a concrete choice of R even stronger attacks may be possible.
and definitions are described and the MOR cryptosystem is introduced. Section 3 shows how to construct a semi-direct product group GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n given a ring isomorphism Φ : R → R and how to apply this group to the MOR cryptosystem. We further demonstrate that the discrete logarithm problem in Inn(GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n ) can be reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in < Φ >. In section 4 we show that MOR using GL(2, R)× θ Z Z n is vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks if the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in < Φ > can be solved efficiently. In the final section 5 the impact of the presented attacks on the security of MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n is discussed and directions for future research are pointed out. The appendix briefly describes how to solve the special conjugacy problem (SCP) in GL (2, R) by solving simultaneous instances of the conjugacy problem (CP) in GL (2, R) .
Related Work:
The conjugacy problem is considered a hard problem in braid groups. There is no known polynomial time algorithm which solves the decisional or the computational conjugacy problem in braid groups. For a detailed discussion of cryptography on braid groups we refer to [1, 3, 5] . Other cryptosystems using the conjugation map on matrix groups have been published by Yamamura [9, 10] . The systems later were broken by Blackburn and Galbraith [2] .
Framework and Definitions

Definition 1 (Semi-Direct Product Group). Let G and H be groups and θ : H → Aut(G) be a homomorphism. The set G × H = {(g, h) | g ∈ G, h ∈ H} together with the multiplication map
is a group, called the semi-direct product G × θ H of G and H with respect to θ.
Definition 2 (The mapping Inn). Let G be a group. Then the mapping
We call Inn(g) an inner automorphism and 
Definition 3 (center, centralizer). Let
In the appendix the terms "center" and "centralizer" are also used for rings resp. ring elements. For a ring R and ring elements r ∈ R we define Z(R) := {r ∈ R | sr = rs ∀s ∈ R} and Z(r) := {s ∈ R | rs = sr}. In some cases it may not be clear from the context which structure is referred to, e.g. for g ∈ GL(2, R) ⊆ M (2, R) the cenralizer Z(g) in the ring M (2, R) may be different from the centralizer Z(g) in the multiplicative group GL (2, R) . In this case the corresponding structure is added as an index, e.g.
Definition 4 (Conjugacy Problem).
Let G be a group. For arbitrary x, y ∈ G the conjugacy problem (CP) is to find w ∈ G such that wxw −1 = y.
Let w ∈ G be a solution of the instance (x, y) of the CP, i.e. wxw −1 = y. Then w · Z(x) is the solution set for instance (x, y).
Definition 5 (Special Conjugacy Problem).
For a given ϕ ∈ Inn(G) the special conjugacy problem is to find an element g ∈ G satisfying Inn(g) = ϕ.
The solution set for instance Inn(g) of the special conjugacy problem is g · Z(G). In GL(2, Z Z p ) the conjugacy problem is easy. To solve the special conjugacy problem in GL(2, Z Z p ) two pairs (A 1 , Inn(A 1 )) and (A 2 , Inn(A 2 )) with A 1 / ∈ Z(A 2 ) are needed (see [8] for details). A similar result holds for the group GL(2, R) of invertible matrices over a commutative ring with identity R (see appendix A).
The MOR cryptosystem:
MOR is an asymmetric cryptosystem with a random value a as secret and the two mappings Inn(g) and Inn(g a ) (given as {Inn(g)(γ i )} and {Inn(g a )(γ i )} for a generator set {γ i } of G) as corresponding public key. The encryption process works as follows:
1. Alice expresses the plaintext m ∈ G as a product of the γ i .
Alice chooses a random
Decryption Process:
1. Bob expresses E as a product of the γ i .
Bob computes
The MOR cryptosystem is very similar to the ElGamal cryptosystem [4] . The Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol is used to fix a common inner automorphism (Inn(g)) ab . The ciphertext of a message m ∈ G is the image of m under Inn(g ab ) = (Inn(g)) ab . In [6] no formal proof of security is given for the MOR system. If the discrete logarithm problem is efficiently solvable in < Inn(g) >, then the secret key a can be calculated from Inn(g), Inn(g a ) which are part of the public key. However, knowledge of the secret key is not necessary to attack the MOR cryptosystem for certain non-abelian groups G (see [8] for details).
MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n
Let R be a commutative ring with identity and Φ : R → R be a (non-trivial) ring
is a (multiplicative) group. A group automorphism φ is induced by Φ:
We now examine MOR using the semi-direct product
The choice of Φ: Let G = GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n and Φ, φ and θ as defined above. Then
The homomorphism θ is well-defined if and only if ord(Φ) | n.
The values a, b, y ∈ Z Z n should have no common divisor with the order of homomorphism φ. Otherwise φ aby is no generator of the cyclic group < φ >. This reduces the number of possible ciphertexts for a plaintext message (
To avoid this problem, we suggest to choose n prime.
Extracting φ y from Inn(g):
We now show that given an inner automorphism Inn(g) for some g = (x, y) ∈ GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n the group automorphism φ y can be calculated efficiently.
Step 1: To calculate φ y we make use of the fact that Φ y (0) = 0 and Φ y (1) = 1. For a unimodular matrix m ∈ GL(2, R) (i.e. a matrix with entries only 0 and 1) it follows that φ y (m) = m and we get
This leads to an instance m, xmx −1 of the conjugacy problem in GL (2, R) . By solving the two instances x −1 of the conjugacy problem in GL(2, R) simultaneously the special conjugacy problem can be solved and an elementx ∈ GL(2, R) with Inn(x) = Inn(x) can be calculated (see appendix A).
Step 2: For arbitrary m ∈ GL(2, R) we get
The image of martix m under φ y can be calculated as follows:
Using the same technique the homomorphism φ ay can be calculated given Inn(g a ). Since Inn(g) and Inn(g a ) are part of the public key, the two ring homomorphisms φ y and φ ay can be calculated efficiently. For the security of MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n it is necessary that the discrete logarithm problem is hard in < φ >. Otherwise a (mod ord(φ)) can be calculated which gives partial information of the secret key a.
Analysis of MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n
The most time consuming operations in the encryption and decryption process of the MOR cryptosystem are the exponentiations in < Inn(g) >. The inner automorphisms are given by the images of the generators γ 1 , . . . γ n of the used group G. To calculate Inn(g 2 )(γ i ), two steps are needed. In the first step Inn(g)(γ i ) has to be expressed as a product of the generators γ i and in the second step the corresponding images Inn(g)(γ i ) have to be multiplied. Since 2 (resp. 1) exponentiations in < Inn(g) > have to be calculated during the encryption (resp. decryption) process, the MOR cryptosystem in its basic form is much too inefficient to be of practical interest. Therefore a variant of MOR has been proposed [6] where the encryption exponent b is used for multiple encryptions. Since the resulting encryption scheme is deterministic, the authors of [6] recommend to use a probabilistic padding scheme when fixing the encryption exponent. We now show that MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n with fixed encryption exponent (even when the probabilistic padding scheme is used) is vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks if the computational Diffie-Hellman Problem in < φ > can be solved (efficiently). From Inn(g a ) (which is part of the public key) and Inn(g b ) (which is part of the ciphertext) the homomorphisms φ ay and φ by can be computed. Solving the computational Diffie-Hellman problem yields φ aby .
Let c = (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ GL(2, R) be a given challenge ciphertext of MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n . In a chosen ciphertext attack the attacker is assumed to have access to a decryption oracle. He is allowed to send ciphertextsĉ = c to the oracle and gets the corresponding plaintext messages. A cryptosystem is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if such an attacker is not able to compute the plaintext corresponding to c efficiently.
In our attack we make use of the fact that the encryption function Inn(g ab ) is an automorphism, i.e.
The attack consists of two steps. In the first step anx ∈ GL(2, R) with Inn(x) = Inn(x) is computed. This elementx is used in the second step to decipher the challenge ciphertext c.
Step 1: (2, R) . Repeating this process generates multiple simultaneous instances of the conjugacy problem in GL(2, R) which can be used to solve the special conjugacy problem in GL(2, R) and get a group elementx ∈ GL(2, R) with Inn(x) = Inn(x) (see appendix A for details).
The oracle may not answer queries with zero as second component, because GL(2, R) × θ {0} is isomorphic to GL(2, R) and the conjugacy problem is efficiently solvable in GL(2, R). In this case the attacker sends queries (d
with the same second component to the decryption oracle: Step 2: Let (p 1 , p 2 ) be the plaintext message encrypted in the challenge ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ). Sincex =x · z for a z ∈ Z(GL(2, R)) we get:
Only one oracle query is necessary to calculate z −1 · φ c2 (z). The attacker chooses a c 3 = c 1 ∈ GL(2, R) and sends (c 3 , c 2 ) to the oracle. Ifm is the answer of the oracle, the attacker gets z −1 · φ c2 (z) as follows:
Now the attacker can compute φ aby (p 1 ).
Step 3: If the knowledge of φ aby is not sufficient to compute p 1 from φ aby (p 1 ), the decryption oracle is used to compute preimages under φ aby . To obtain the preimage of φ aby (p 1 ) the attacker sends
as query to the decryption oracle. Using a randomised padding scheme: In [6] the authors propose to use a probabilistic padding scheme when fixing the encryption exponent. The plaintext message m ∈ R is embedded in GL(2, R) by choosing a random matrix
∈ GL(2, R) with m 1 = m. After that the encryption function Inn(g ab ) is applied to M . In [8] it has been shown that MOR using SL(2, Z Z p )× θ Z Z n is insecure even if the randomised padding scheme is used: Two pairs consisting of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext are sufficient to calculate Inn(g ab ). The same techniques can be applied to step 1 of our attack to calculate an elementx ∈ GL(2, R) with
The first part of step 2 also works if the described padding scheme is used, i.e. φ aby (p 1 ) · z −1 · φ c2 (z) can be calculated. The second part of step 2 has to be changed slightly: On input (c 3 , c 2 ) the decryption oracle outputs only the (1, 1)-component ofm. The other entries of matrixm are not known to the attacker.
we get
The valuem 1 can be obtained by sending (c 3 , c 2 ) to the decryption oracle. If r cannot be calculated givenm 1 and r ·m 1 this process has to be repeated with a different value c 3 .
Step 3 also works when the randomised padding scheme is used but has to be carried out for every single component, i.e. to compute the preimage of
step 3 is used to find preimages of d i ∈ GL(2, R),
Conclusion
We showed that MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n with fixed encryption exponent is vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks if the computational Diffie-Hellman Problem is easy in < Φ >. The presented attacks still work if the randomised padding scheme of [6] is used. They do not work if the encryption exponent b is randomly chosen for every plaintext to be encrypted. However, in this case two exponentiations in < Inn(g) > have to be calculated during the encryption and one during the decryption process. The resulting cryptosystem is too inefficient to be of practical interest. Our results show that the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in < Φ > is essential for the security of all modes of MOR (even when the encryption exponent b is chosen randomly and independently for every plaintext to be encrypted). The DLP in < Φ > is much easier than the DLP in < Inn(g) > (which has to be solved to calculate the secret key given the public key). It may be more appropriate to use a variant of the ElGamal cryptosystem [4] using the cyclic group < Φ >. The resulting cryptosystem would be provable secure and more efficient than MOR using GL(2, R) × θ Z Z n . All attacks are generic attacks, i.e. they work for every ring R and every homomorphism Φ. For certain choices of R and Φ there may be even stronger attacks. It is a task for future reserach to find a non-abelian group suitable for the use with the MOR cryptosystem.
A The Special Conjugacy Problem in GL(2, R)
Let Inn(g) : GL(2, R) → GL(2, R) be a public inner automorphism. We assume that Inn(g) is given as a black box, i.e. an attacker is able to calculate images under Inn(g) but does not know the used g ∈ GL (2, R) . This approach assures that our calculations are independent of the presentation of Inn(g). We now show that the special conjugacy problem is efficiently solvable in GL(2, R).
Let B, C, X ∈ GL(2, R) and B, XBX
be two simultaneous instances of the conjugacy problem in GL(2, R).
LetX ∈ GL(2, R) be a solution of these two instances. ThenX = Z · X with z1 z2 z3 z4
By comparing the components of Z ·B,B · Z and Z ·Ĉ,Ĉ · Z we get:
SinceX could also be expressed asX = X ·Ẑ for aẐ ∈ Z(B) ∩ Z(C), the following paragraph is also true ifbi andĉi are replaced by bi and ci. In particular B ∈ Z(C) ⇔B ∈ Z(Ĉ).
. Therefore, wereB,Ĉ ∈ GL(2, R) chosen such thatB / ∈ Z(Ĉ), one of the equations has to be false and z 2 and z 3 are zero divisors. R) is a solution of the instance Inn(X) of the special conjugacy problem in GL(2, R).
We now show that a simultaneous solution of these two instances can be calculated efficiently. The equations XBX −1 =B and XCX −1 =Ĉ are equivalent to XB =BX and XC =ĈX. If B / ∈ Z(C) this yields to a system of three linear equations. In the presented attack in section 4 the elementsB,Ĉ ∈ GL(2, R) can be chosen freely. Ifb 3 is invertible, the obtained system of linear equations is equivalent to: 
